I claim no absolute knowledge of anything, on any matter. Thus, I can BELIEVE things to different degrees of certainty, being that, when I am most certain, the sentence "I believe" is generally substituted by "I know", without the two being mutually exclusive - rather, knowledge is a subset of belief, not a different mental process. For me, it would make no sense to say "I don't believe that this apple is green, I KNOW it is green." Perhaps this sentence would be acceptable for someone who claims that absolute truth and knowledge are attainable, and, as such, different from believing something without actually knowing it. I claim no such thing.
Therefore, knowledge is a subset of belief, i.e. belief in something with maximal certainty, but not absolute certainty.
Having said this, it can understood that knowledge does not necessarily imply truth. If I said "I know an ostrich is not a bird", and some other person said, equally with maximal certainty "I, for instance, know that an ostrich is a bird", both people happen to have the highest possible certainty about the veracity of something. They both KNOW something to be true, and are utterly convinced by it. In what we consider to be reality, an ostrich is either a bird or it is not, and only one of the assertions is according to reality - therefore:
Knowledge does not imply truth, but rather self-conviction of truth with maximal certainty.
If knowledge does not imply truth, does any truth exist for those who do not claim to know anything in absolute? Does this concept escapes us, once again, between the philosophical divagations, to be lost among the metaphysical waste of human consciousness? For now, I am not worried about absolute truth, but rather "practical" truth, which is the one who has any effect on the world that I experience. Although young and foolish regarding philosophical issues, I believe that focusing on practicality, or practical knowledge, rather than spending a lifetime dwelling in the deep caves of absolutes, is more healthy, productive and makes better justice to the role of a modern philosopher.